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ABSTRACT
Although there is evidence that divorce and volunteering are related,
little is known about the process by which divorce affects volunteer-
ing. Using four-wave panel data spanning 16 years, this study exam-
ines the causal mechanisms underlying changes in volunteering
following divorce. Results from estimating structural equation models
indicated that divorce affects volunteering through different mechan-
isms for women and men. For women, increased financial strain
explained a decline in volunteering after divorce. For men, decreased
social integration measured by formal group participation accounted
for a decline in volunteering after divorce. Domain-specific analyses
further showed that decreased religious attendance following divorce
explained a decline in religious volunteering and, at the same time,
an increase in secular volunteering among men but not women. Men
appear to switch their volunteering domains from religious to secular
organizations after divorce.
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Beginning with Wilson and Musick’s (1997) treatment of volunteering as productive work,
volunteering has been examined through the lens of resources theory (for a recent example, see
Forbes and Zampelli 2014). At its core, resources theory sees volunteering as productive work
that demands resources. Like paid labor, the performance of volunteer work requires both
individual and social resources. Not surprisingly, studies of volunteering have consistently
found that those with greater resources (e.g., more education, larger income, andmore extensive
social networks) tend to volunteer more frequently than those with less (Wilson 2000, 2012). If
individual and social resources are necessary for volunteering, changes in the levels of such
resources, for instance, due to stressful life events, may affect volunteering behavior. This study
examines the mechanisms of such a change relative to the event of divorce.
Divorce affects almost all aspects of life: physical (Dupre et al. 2015), psychological (Johnson
andWu 2002), economic (Tamborini, Couch, and Reznik 2015), social (Kalmijn and Broese van
Groenou 2005), and geographic (Geist and McManus 2008). Civic life is another important
aspect of life, which we expect, will also be affected by divorce. Indeed, previous studies have
shown that divorce inhibits participation in political activism (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006) and
voting (Kern 2010).
This study examined whether getting divorced affects volunteering—here defined as
unpaid productive work performed through or for an organization (U.S. Bureau of Labor
CONTACT Young-Il Kim ykim@georgefox.edu Department of History, Sociology, and Politics, George Fox
University, 414 N. Meridian St. #6244, Newberg, OR 97132, USA.
Statistics 2015)—and, if so, how. We were particularly interested in examining gender
differences in the effects of divorce on volunteering and its causal mechanisms, given the
already-existing evidence of such differences. Recent studies based on panel data from
Switzerland and the United States have shown differential effects of divorce on volunteer-
ing, showing that it reduces volunteering among women in Switzerland (Voorpostel and
Coffé 2012), while it increases volunteering for men working with secular organizations in
the United States (Nesbit 2012).
These studies have offered speculation on possible explanations for changes in levels of
volunteering after a divorce, but neither study tested a causal mechanism that could
explain why one’s volunteering behavior would change as one exits one’s marriage. We
addressed this gap in research. Using four-wave panel data gathered by the Americans’
Changing Lives study, which followed a national sample of U.S. adults for 16 years, from
1986 to 2002, this study makes the following contributions to the literature. First, our use
of four-wave panel data allowed us to establish causal order among divorce, postdivorce
socioeconomic hardships, and volunteering. Previous studies, which were based on two-
wave panel data, were limited in their ability to assess their causal relationships, as in those
cases, socioeconomic hardships were measured concurrently with divorce or volunteering.
Second, our panel data enable us to control for levels of socioeconomic hardship that
preceded divorce. If previous socioeconomic hardships are not controlled for, it is
impossible to attribute any difference between pre- and post-divorce levels of volunteering
to divorce-generated hardships, because hardships may exist and accumulate even before a
divorce (Booth, Edwards, and Johnson 1991; Conger et al. 1990).
Lastly, previous studies have not been able to assess long-term influences of divorce on
volunteering because they have relied on data that show relatively short time lags between
waves, specifically, 2 to 7 years apart (Nesbit 2012; Voorpostel and Coffé 2012). Research
on the relationship of divorce to mental health (Lorenz et al. 2006) and life satisfaction
(Clark et al. 2008) has generally found only short-term adverse effects, and the same may
be true for volunteering. It remains an empirical question whether and “how the length of
time after [divorce] is related to volunteering (Nesbit 2012:1171).” Assessing divorced
people at two time points, we examined whether the length of time following a divorce
affects volunteering. In what follows, we briefly review resources theory, on which this
study is based.
Theoretical Background
Resources Theory
Resources theory treats volunteering as a form of work that produces value (Musick and
Wilson 2008:111). The conceptualization of volunteering as a productive activity brings to
light resources that can be consumed to provide goods and services for the benefit of
others. If volunteering is considered relative to production, it is immediately recognizable
that resources are scarce and unevenly distributed in society. Musick and Wilson
(2008:113) describe this state of affairs as follows:
Volunteering is more attractive to the resource-rich than to the resource-poor. If volunteer
work demands money, the rich will find it easier to do; if it demands knowledge and “civic
skills,” the well educated will be less challenged by it; if it requires heavy lifting, the physically
healthy will find it more tolerable; if it is very time consuming, those with “time on their
hands” will find it easier to beat the burden. In other words, the resource-rich are more likely
to “profit” from doing volunteer work.
Among the many resources that can be utilized in volunteering, economic and social
ones are identified as critical facilitators of it (Musick and Wilson 2008). Our literature
review focuses on these forms of resources.
Volunteers freely give their time, not necessarily their money, but extensive research
has confirmed a positive relationship between economic resources such as family income
and volunteering (e.g., Rotolo and Wilson 2012). Why do people with greater economic
resources volunteer more frequently than those without? A sociological explanation of this
phenomenon is that volunteering brings social status and recognition. This “dominant
status” theory suggests that the availability of greater economic resources increases
volunteering because those with greater resources are more likely to be asked in the first
place (Smith 1994; Wilson and Musick 1997).
Thus, it may be that people with greater economic resources volunteer more frequently
because their economic status provides themwithmore social resources. Social resources theory
proposes that access to social resources that are embedded in social networks leads to status (Lin
2001:43). Social resources are especially crucial in recruitment of volunteers, and people who are
more closely integrated into social networks tend to be asked more to volunteer (Musick and
Wilson 2008). Evidence suggests that social resources interact with economic resources in
boosting volunteering (Wilson and Musick 1998). In a later study, Musick and Wilson
(2008:129) found that people with greater economic resources volunteer more partly because
they belong to a greater number of voluntary associations.
Religious congregations are among the most important voluntary organizations recruit-
ing volunteers (Putnam 2000). The volunteering literature has consistently documented
that attendance of religious services is one of the strongest predictors for volunteer work
(Kim and Jang 2017). Because of the role that religious congregations play in the
volunteering sector, it is expected that a change in the level of religious participation
leads to changes in patterns of volunteering. Below, we review the sociological literature
dealing with divorce and its social and economic consequences for volunteering.
Divorce, Financial Strain, and Volunteering
Divorce has adverse effects on economicwell-being (Amato 2000), and low economicwell-being,
in turn, may affect volunteering negatively. Research has shown that the subjective assessment of
one’s economic needs better predict volunteering than objective indicators of economic well-
being, such as family income. The Independent Sector reported that those with concerns relating
to financial burdens were less likely to volunteer and that this pattern held for all income groups
(Independent Sector 2001:7). More recently, Son andWilson (2015) provided evidence that the
effect of household income on volunteering disappeared when chronic financial strain was taken
into account, suggesting that family income affected volunteering only indirectly, via financial
strain. To extend this line of research, we propose that increased financial strain following
divorce can account for declines in volunteering after divorce.
Further, we suggest a gender effect here. Previous research has consistently shown that
women face greater financial difficulties after divorce than men do (Holden and Smock
1991; Raz-Yurovich 2013; Smock, Manning, and Gupta 1999). This gender gap in post-
divorce economic well-being suggests that, if increased economic hardship drives declines
in volunteering, women’s volunteering will decline more than men’s. Two qualitative
studies have provided insight into possible gender differences in economic consequences
of divorce on volunteering. In her work on the social integration of divorced women,
Gerstel (1988:360) reported that many of her study participants could not join voluntary
associations due to lack of money. Volunteer work is usually coordinated by a voluntary
association that may require membership fees and other expenses, and economic hardship
could prevent divorced women from joining such associations.
Greater economic burdens on divorced women may also result in greater time con-
straints. In another qualitative study, McBride et al. (2006) provided evidence for this idea.
One participant of their study was asked whether she was involved in her community. She
said, “Umm, I tried to be. But I have to work two jobs to make my ends meet. So I’m not
very, I don’t get involved as much I’d like” (p. 158). Of course, divorced men may also
experience time constraints relative to volunteering, but because women retain child
custody more often than men do, divorced women tend to be more pressed for time;
they spend time not only on paid work but also on childcare. This reasoning leads to the
hypothesis that if volunteering is found to decrease after divorce due to increased financial
difficulties, this phenomenon is more likely to occur among women than among men.
Divorce, Social Integration, and Volunteering
Divorce is generally associated with changes in social networks, both in terms of partici-
pation in informal social networks and formal voluntary associations (Milardo 1987).
While it may be that divorced individuals create and develop new social ties, studies have
typically found declines in participation in both social networks and formal groups
following divorce. This is partly because of the loss of the joint social network and joint
activities (Kalmijn and Bernasco 2001; Terhell et al. 2004). Using a Dutch national sample
of first-married and ever-divorced people, one study found that divorce decreased parti-
cipation in social clubs and religious services among women and in outdoor recreation
clubs among men (Kalmijn and Broese van Groenou 2005).
Much evidence has been found showing that, between the two forms of social integra-
tion, formal group participation predicts volunteering better than informal social networks
do. One recent study found that the social time spent with family, friends, and neighbors
failed to increase the likelihood of volunteering, although spending time with friends from
voluntary associations did increase (Musick and Wilson 2008:269, see also Table 78). This
finding suggests that voluntary associations form a crucial conduit for the dissemination
of volunteer opportunities and the recruitment of potential volunteers are recruited. One
is more likely to be asked to volunteer when one’s social networks are embedded in
voluntary associations. Because volunteer recruitment typically occurs in an organizational
setting, changes in patterns of formal group participation are more likely to be responsible
for changes in volunteering after divorce than changes in social contacts are. Therefore, we
predict that divorce decreases volunteering by reducing participation in formal groups.
In addition to this general hypothesis, we propose specific hypotheses on the types of
volunteer organizations, as divorced individuals may volunteer more or less than they
used to, depending on where they volunteer. It may be that divorced individuals decrease
their involvement in certain types of volunteer organizations more than they do in others.
If a couple once volunteered at an organization in which divorce is stigmatizing, the
couple—at least the partner who is blamed for the divorce—is less likely to continue to
volunteer at that organization. This is what Kalmijn and Uunk (2007) called the stigma-
tization hypothesis. Using combined data from the European Community Household
Panel and the European Value Survey, they found that divorced individuals living in
regions with greater intolerance of divorce reported greater declines in social contacts than
those living in regions with greater tolerance.
If this finding applies to volunteer organizations, we can expect divorce to result in
decreased volunteering at religious organizations due to a corresponding decrease in
attendance at religious services. Because the married are more likely to attend religious
services than the unmarried (Gallup 2010), and because religious institutions have long
endorsed a pro-marriage ethos (Christiano 2000), the institutionalization of marriage
norms produce less acceptance of divorce. In such an environment, divorced individuals
may consider themselves to be “strangers,” who may be inside the church yet feel
themselves outside of it (Simmel [1908]1950:402). If religious volunteering decreases
after divorce, it may be because divorced individuals attend religious services less fre-
quently than married people do.
If this is true, are men or women more likely to become isolated from their religious
communities after divorce? A study of marriage in men’s lives may provide an answer. This
work found that religion is of particular importance to married men (Nock 1998). Using
data from two waves of the National Survey of Families and Households, Nock found that,
following marriage, men became more involved in organized religion, as measured by
attendance frequency at religious services, participation in social events at church, and
membership in church-related groups (pp. 94–95). If being married encourages men to
increase involvement in organized religion, then it would logically follow that the dissolu-
tion of marriage may bring an opposite effect, namely, disengagement from it. Indeed, this is
exactly what Nock found: that is, attendance at religious services decreased amongmen after
divorce (p. 146). Can the same be expected for women?
Although a Dutch study did find women decreased attendance at religious services after
divorce (Kalmijn and Broese van Groenou 2005), a U.S. national study found the opposite,
an increase in women’s religious participation after divorce (Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy, and
Waite 1995). More specifically, the U.S. study found marked gender differences in
religious participation after divorce: “Divorce increases the probabilities of religious
participation for 32-year-old women, while decreasing it for 32-year-old men” (p. 100).
This result was consistent with the finding of Hetherington and Kelly (2002), who
demonstrated the role of congregations in providing a female study participant with “a
sense of rootedness, security, and belonging” (p. 76). These findings lead to the expecta-
tion that men, after divorce, will attend religious services less frequently than they used to,
and this will in turn reduce their volunteering for religious organizations.
If divorce has an indirect negative effect on religious volunteering through declines in
attendance at religious services, it is quite conceivable that divorce may have a different
effect on secular volunteering, namely, an indirect positive effect, through the decline in
religious service attendance. This idea aligns with the liberation hypothesis, which predicts
that, relative to their married counterparts, the divorced are more broadly integrated into
social networks (Gerstel 1988; Kalmijn and Broese van Groenou 2005). For men in
particular, divorce may bring new opportunities for social relationships that they encoun-
ter in the search for new partners. This is plausible because, unlike women, who cope with
divorce using existing support networks, men tend to seek new social ties and participate
in voluntary associations (Gerstel 1988:344; Terhell et al. 2004:735). If this supposition is
accurate, it could explain Nesbit’s (2012) finding that divorce increases men’s but not
women’s secular volunteering.
The Current Study
This study examines gender differences in the causal mechanisms of postdivorce changes
in volunteering. Two previous studies have examined the direct relationship between
divorce and volunteering, showing decreases in volunteering following divorce among
women (Voorpostel and Coffé 2012) and increases in secular volunteering following
divorce among men (Nesbit 2012). Using structural equation modeling, we extended
these studies, investigating gender differences in the indirect effects of divorce on volun-
teering via two mechanisms: increased economic hardship and decreased social integra-
tion. The literature on gender gaps in postdivorce economic hardship leads to the
hypothesis that divorce is more likely to decrease volunteering among women than
among men through the mechanism of increasing financial strain (Hypothesis 1).
Second, the literature on the effects of divorce on social integration supports the hypoth-
esis that divorce decreases volunteering by decreasing social integration, as measured by
attendance at religious services and participation in voluntary associations, among both
men and women (Hypothesis 2). Finally, drawing on the stigmatization and liberation
thesis, we examine the mechanism of social (dis)integration mechanism by testing whether
decreased attendance at religious services contributes to decreases in religious volunteer-
ing (Hypothesis 3) and increases in secular volunteering among men (Hypothesis 4).
Method
Data and Sample
We used four waves of panel data spanning 16 years (1986–2002) from the Americans’
Changing Lives (ACL) Study (House 2002). In 1986, a nationally representative sample of
adults aged 25 years and older was selected through a multistage stratified area probability
sampling with an oversampling of African Americans and those aged 60 and older
(N = 3,617). The second wave of data (N = 2,867) was collected in 1989. Five years
later, in 1994, the third wave of data (N = 2,562) was collected. Finally, the fourth wave of
data (N = 1,787) was collected from 2001 to 2002. Our analytic sample consists of the
1,787 respondents who completed Waves 1 and 4 surveys, regardless of whether they
completed Wave 2 or 3.1
Our sample is representative of the surviving adults of the U.S. population in 1986, as
our analyses were weighted by the wave-specific sample weights (V12962) provided by
ACL (House, Lantz, and Herd 2005). Variables with missing data were few (<0.1%), but to
handle missing data, we used the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) procedure,
which is one of two “state-of-the-art” methods along with multiple imputation (Schafer
and Graham 2002:147). The full information approach utilizes all available information by
including partially complete cases to provide a maximum likelihood estimation. That is,
probable values for missing data points are implied by observed variables, and the
inclusion of the partially complete cases increases the precision and accuracy of parameter
estimates (Enders and Bandalos 2001).
Measures
Volunteering
Our measures of volunteering include the range of volunteering (i.e., the number of
organization types in which the respondent volunteered) and volunteer hours. These
two measures complement each other: volunteering range captures the breadth of volun-
teer activities, while volunteer hours focuses more on the depth. To test Hypotheses 3 and
4, we included two domain-specific measures: secular volunteering and religious
volunteering.
Volunteering Range. In each interview, respondents were asked whether they did volun-
teer work during the past year for different types of organization: (a) a church, synagogue,
or other religious organization; (b) a school or educational organization; (c) a political
group or labor union; (d) a senior citizens group or related organization; and (e) any other
national or local organization, including United Fund, hospitals, and the like. Responses
to each category were coded 1 = “yes,” 0 = “no.” Following Wilson and Musick (1997), we
summed the types of volunteering organizations, which ranged from 0 to 5.
Volunteer Hours. Respondents’ hours of volunteering in the previous year of the survey
were also assessed at four time points. They were asked: “About how many hours did you
spend on volunteer work of (this kind/these kinds) during the last 12 months?” Response
choices were 1 = “less than 20 hours,” 2 = “20–39 hours,” 3 = “40–79 hours,” 4 = “80–
159 hours,” 5 = “160 hours or more.” Following Thoits and Hewitt (2001), we converted this
ordinal measure into a continuous variable by assigning midpoints, 10, 30, 60, 120 except
the last category, which was coded as 200 hours, with 0 hours being assigned to those who
did not volunteer. We then took the natural log to reduce skewness (we added .01 to avoid
taking the log of zero).
Secular Volunteering. Respondents who answered “yes” to volunteering for any type of
nonreligious organizations were coded 1; those answering “no” were coded 0.
Religious Volunteering. Respondents who reported “yes” to volunteering for a church,
synagogue, or other religious organization were coded 1; those responding “no” were
coded 0.
Transitions to Divorce
To measure changes in the respondent’s marital status (1 = “married,” 2 = “divorced,”
3 = “widowed,” 4 = “never married”) between Times 1 and 3, we constructed four dummy
variables, three of which capture all transitions to divorce: (a) married at Time 1 but
divorced at Time 2 and remained divorced through Time 3 (n = 28); (b) married through
Time 2 but divorced at Time 3 (n = 49); and (c) married at Time 1 and divorced at Time 2
but remarried at Time 3 (n = 18).2 A fourth dummy variable of “other” includes 740
respondents who did not fall in one of the three categories of transition to divorce (e.g.,
never married at Time 1 and married at Time 2 and divorced at Time 3, divorced at Time
1 and married at Time 2 and widowed at Time 3, etc.).3 The reference category was those
who married through Time 3 (n = 952).
Mediators
Financial Strain. Financial strain is a standardized index of two items. Respondents were
asked: “Now a few questions about (your/your family’s) financial situation. (a) How satisfied
are you with (your/your family’s) present financial situation?”Original responses ranged from
1 (“completely satisfied”) to 5 (“not at all satisfied”). And then asked: “How difficult is it for
(you/your family) to meet the monthly payments on your (family’s) bills?”Original responses
ranged from 1 (“extremely difficult”) to 5 (“not difficult at all”). These two items were reverse
coded so that higher scores indicated greater difficulty. Two items were then summed and
standardized to create an index of financial strain (Cronbach’s alpha = .80).
Religious Service Attendance. At each of four waves, respondents were asked how often
they usually attended religious services. The response categories were 1 (“never”) to 6
(“more than once a week”).
Group Participation. Respondents were asked: “How often do you attend meetings or
programs of groups, clubs or organizations that you belong to?” The response categories
were same as religious service attendance.
Background Variables
Following previous research on volunteering, we included several covariates of volunteer-
ing, including sociodemographic variables. Race and ethnicity was measured using a
dummy variable, non-Hispanic Black, with non-Hispanic White being a reference cate-
gory. Age was coded in years. Education (years of schooling) ranged from 0 to 17, whereas
family income was measured based on a 10-point ordinal scale ranging from 1 (“Less than
$5,000”) to 10 (“$80,000 or more”). Work hours were measured by an item asking, “On
average, how many hours a week do you work on this job, including paid and unpaid
overtime?” Housework hours were measured based on an item asking, “Altogether, about
how many hours do you spend doing these things [prepare food for meals or wash dishes,
do grocery shopping, cleaning, doing laundry, sew and mend] in an average week?” For
employment status, a dummy variable was constructed (employed = 1), and depression was
a standardized index using the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression (CES-D)
scale (Radloff 1977) (Cronbach’s alpha = .83). We also computed the number of children
aged 0–17 in the household using information about children at home.
Analytic Strategy
We used structural equation modeling to test our hypotheses. To estimate our structural
equation models, we used Mplus 8 (Muthén and Muthén 2017); this incorporates
Muthén’s (1983) “general structural equation model,” which allows not only continuous
but also dichotomous and ordered polytomous variables to be included in a model.
Because our measures of endogenous constructs are ordered categorical (financial strain,
religious attendance, group involvement) and count (number of volunteering organization
types) as well as continuous variable (volunteer hours), we employed the estimator of
MLR: “maximum likelihood parameter estimates with standard errors . . . that are robust
to non-normality and non-independence of observations” (Muthén and Muthén
2017:668). Finally, for model fit assessment, we focus on joint criteria using three types
of fit index (Hu and Bentler 1999): incremental (Comparative Fit Index, CFI), absolute
(Standardized Root Mean Square Residual, SRMR), and parsimonious (Root Mean Square
Error of Approximation, RMSEA). Specifically, a model was determined to have a good fit
to data if one of two joint criteria, (CFI ≥ .96 and SRMR ≤ .09) or (SRMR ≤ .09 and
RMSEA ≤ .06), was met.
Figure 1 visualizes the relationships predicted in Hypotheses 1 and 2 about volunteer
range and hours (Model 1), whereas those predicted in Hypotheses 3 and 4 about religious
and secular volunteering are shown in Figure 2 (Model 2). In both Models 1 and 2, causal
paths from the dummy variables of getting divorced (i.e., Married T1–Divorced T2–
Divorced T3, Married T1–Divorced T2–Remarried T3, and Married T1–Married T2–
Divorced T3) to endogenous constructs at Time 2 were constrained to be zero because
paths from the former to the latter would violate the necessary condition of time sequence
for causality. For example, in the case of Model 1, a total of 15 paths were not estimated
given that Model 1 has three transition-to-divorce dummy variables and five measures of
Figure 1. Conceptual Model 1: Mediating effects of economic and social hardships on changes in
volunteering after divorce.
Note: Model fit statistics: χ2 (30) = 37.127, p = .173; CFI = 1.000; RMSEA = .016 (90% C.I.: .000, .032);
SRMR = .005. T1 = 1986. T2 = 1989. T3 = 1994. T4 = 2002. Only hypothesized paths with standardized
coefficients are shown to reduce clutter. On each path, the first coefficient represents men and the
second represents women. Model controls for autoregressive endogenous variables, race, age1,
education1, family income1, work hours1, housework hours1, depression1, and number of children
under 18 in household1 (see Appendix Tables A2 and A3 for the coefficients of control variables).*
p < .05 (two-tailed).
endogenous constructs (i.e., financial strain, religious attendance, group involvement,
volunteering range, and volunteer hours) at Time 2. Because the models were simulta-
neously estimated separately for men and women, its overall degrees of freedom is 30
(15 × 2 gender groups). Thus, we would need the test of model fit to be interpreted for
hypothesis testing.
Results
Appendix Table A1 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables included in analysis,
presented separately for male (n = 652) and female (n = 1,135) as well as total sample
(n = 1,787).
Model 1
Tables 1 and 2 present results from estimating Model 1 that specifies the mediation of
financial strain and social integration, measured by religious attendance and group
involvement, between a transition to divorce and volunteering for men and women,
respectively. The unstandardized (B) and standardized coefficients (β) are shown for
each endogenous variable, controlling for race, age, education, family income, work
hours, housework hours, number of children under 18 in household, and depression
(see Appendix Tables A2 and A3 for the coefficients of control variables). Model fit was
Figure 2. Conceptual Model 2: Mediating effects of religious attendance on changes in religious and
secular volunteering after divorce.
Note: Model fit statistics: χ2 (30) = 49.945, p = .012; CFI = .998; RMSEA = .027 (90% C.I.: .013, .040);
SRMR = .008. T1 = 1986. T2 = 1989. T3 = 1994. T4 = 2002. Only hypothesized paths with standardized
coefficients are shown to reduce clutter. On each path, the first coefficient represents men and the
second represents women. Model controls for autoregressive endogenous variables, race, age1,
education1, family income1, work hours1, housework hours1, depression1, and number of children
under 18 in household1.* p < .05 (two-tailed).
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good (CFI = .998, RMSEA = .025, and SRMR = .008), meeting both joint criteria,
(CFI ≥ .96 and SRMR ≤ .09) and (SRMR ≤ .09 and RMSEA ≤ .06). We also present
standardized coefficients in Figure 1 for visualization of our results to test the first two
hypotheses. On each path, the first coefficient represents men, whereas the second
coefficient after slash represents women.
Increased Financial Strain
To begin with, the second column of Table 1 shows that, for men, the effect of a transition to
divorce on volunteering at Time 4 was not found to be mediated by subsequent financial
strain, as the transitions—either Mar1Div2Div3 or Mar1Mar2Div3—had no significant effect
on financial strain at Time 3, regardless of whether divorce occurred between Times 1 and 2
(B = .288, β = .039; p > .05), or between Times 2 and 3 (B = .327, β = .072; p > .05).
On the contrary, the second column in the top panel of Table 2 shows that both women
who divorced at Time 2 and remained divorced until Time 3 (Mar1Div2Div3) and those who
remained married until Time 2 but divorced at Time 3 (Mar1Mar2Div3) reported more
financial strain between Times 2 and 3 than those who remained married through Time 3
(B = .639, β = .087 and B = .619, β = .115, respectively), which in turn is associated with a
decline in both the range of volunteering and volunteer hours at Time 4 (B = –.107, β = –.092
and B = –.393, β = –.090; the fourth and seventh columns in the bottom panel of Table 2).
Results from testing statistical significance of the indirect effects presented in Table 3
indicated that three the four indirect effects were significant (see Table 3, first three
rows) except the effect of Mar1Div2Div3 on volunteer hours (B = –.251, β = –.008;
p > .05; not shown in the table). Thus, Hypothesis 1 was supported. While not
hypothesized, interestingly, the second column of the top panel of Table 2 shows that
those women who remarried at Time 3 after getting divorced between Times 1 and 2
reported less financial strain (B = –.573, β = –.079) than those who remained married
through Time 3.
Table 3. Summary of indirect effects.
Model Group Indirect Effect B β Sig. Support
Model
1
Women Married (T1)-Divorced (T2)-Divorced (T3) → Financial strain (T3) →
Volunteer range (T4)
–.069 –.007 * H1
Married (T1)-Married (T2)-Divorced (T3) → Financial strain (T3) →
Volunteering hours (T4)
–.244 –.010 * H1
Married (T1)-Married (T2)-Divorced (T3) → Financial strain (T3) →
Volunteer range (T4)
–.066 –.011 * H1
Men Married (T1)-Married (T2)-Divorced (T3) → Group involvement (T3) →
Volunteer range (T4)
–.065 –.012 * H2
Married (T1)-Married (T2)-Divorced (T3) → Group involvement (T3) →
Volunteering hours (T4)
–.329 –.016 * H2
Model
2
Women None
Men Married (T1)-Divorced (T2)-Divorced (T3) → Religious attendance (T3) →
Religious volunteering (T4)
–.057 –.015 * H3
Married (T1)-Divorced (T2)-Divorced (T3) → Religious attendance (T3) →
Secular volunteering (T4)
.035 .010 * H4
Note. Model fit statistics for Model 1: χ2 (30) = 50.766, p = .010; CFI = .998; RMSEA = .028 (90% C.I.: .014, .041);
SRMR = .007. Model fit statistics for Model 2: χ2 (30) = 49.945, p = .012; CFI = .998; RMSEA = .027 (90% C.I.: .013, .040);
SRMR = .008. B = Unstandardized coefficients. β = Standardized coefficients. T1 = Time 1 (1986). T2 = Time 2 (1989).
T3 = Time 3 (1994). T4 = Time 4 (2002). Only hypothesized and significant paths are shown.
* p < .05 (one-tailed).
Decreased Social Integration
Turning to the results for two measures of social integration (religious attendance and
group involvement), we found significant indirect effects for men as summarized in
Table 3 (also see Figure 1). We see that men who divorced between Times 2 and 3
reduced both volunteer range and volunteering hours at Time 4 as a result of decreased
group involvement at Time 3 (see the fourth and fifth rows in Table 3), while no
significant mediation by religious attendance was found among those who got divorced
between Times 1 and 2 and remained so at Time 3. We also see that there was no
significant difference in reports of religious attendance between men who remarried at
Time 3 and those who remained married through Time 3 (B = .606, β = .045; p > .05).
Taken together, these findings partially support Hypothesis 2.
Model 2
Decreased Social Integration in Religious Communities
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of Model 2 for men and women, respectively. Here
we intend to investigate whether decreased attendance at religious services accounts for
the decrease in religious volunteering (Hypothesis 3) and the increase in secular
volunteering (Hypothesis 4). While this model was estimated with control variables
included in Model 1, their coefficients are not shown for space constraints (available on
request). While this model’s chi-square was significant (χ2 = 59.859, df = 30,
p = .022 < .050), all other fit indices indicated good fit to data as the model met
both joint criteria (CFI = .998, RMSEA = .024, and SRMR = .008). For consistency,
Model 2 included other mediators used in Model 1 (i.e., financial strain and group
involvement), but given our interest in religious attendance, we only discuss results
hypothesized in Model 2.
Table 4 shows that, for men, a transition to divorce reduced religious volunteering at
Time 4 as a result of decreased religious attendance at Time 3 (fifth column), specifically,
divorce occurred between Times 1 and 2 (B = –.809, β = –.056), though not getting
divorced between Times 2 and 3 (B = –.500, β = –.056; p > .05; see the fifth column in the
top panel of Table 3). Religious attendance at Time 3 was in turn positively related to
religious volunteering at Time 4 (B = .071, β = .263) and inversely to secular volunteer at
Time 4 (B = –.043, β = –.182). Indirect effects of a transition to divorce between Times 1
and 2 on religious (B = –.057, β = –.015) and secular volunteering (B = .035, β = .010)
were both found significant in the expected direction (see the bottom two rows in
Table 3). On the other hand, the fifth column of the top panel of Table 5 shows no
significant difference among women in attendance at religious services, whether they
remained married across waves, got divorced between Times 1 and 2 (B = –.526,
β = –.039; p > .05), or divorced between Times 2 and 3 (B = –.141, β = –.014; p > .05).
As a result, indirect effect of a transition to divorce on either volunteering was found to be
significant. These findings support Hypotheses 3 and 4.
Discussion
Gender differences in the social and economic consequences of divorce have been of
interest to sociologists for many years. Little attention, however, has been paid to the
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implications of those consequences for civic life. With a focus on one form of civic
engagement, volunteering, we sought to explain gender differences in the effects of divorce
on volunteering using panel data. The literature on social and economic resources theory
and the observation of gender differences in the effects of divorce on economic and social
well-being guided us to the hypothesis that economic and social hardships could mediate
the inverse relationship between divorce and volunteering. Our structural equation ana-
lysis revealed three major findings.
First, we found that two mediators were responsible for changes in volunteering after
divorce, and each was responsible for changes in a different gender: these were increased
financial strain for women and decreased social integration for men. Those findings were
consistent with the conception that, after divorce, women tend to suffer more from
financial loss than do men, whereas men are more likely to suffer from social isolation
(e.g., see Gerstel, Riessman, and Rosenfield 1985). However, previous research has left
unexamined whether postdivorce financial hardship and social isolation are responsible
for postdivorce declines volunteering, respectively.
Second, adverse effects of divorce on volunteering continued for men and women who had
been divorced for a long time. First, women who had been divorced since Time 1 were still
experiencing financial strain at Time 3, which in turn reduced volunteering at Time 4.We also
found that declines in religious attendance mediated relationships between divorce and
volunteering only for men who had been divorced for a long period, specifically, 5 to
8 years, However, for men who had been divorced for a relatively short period of time, this
causal mechanism was not evident. The literature on divorce has documented similar effects
of being divorced for long periods of time with regard to psychological distress (Johnson and
Wu 2002), and the present study adds to that literature by providing evidence that women’s
financial hardship and men’s religious disengagement after divorce linger for at least a decade
and continue to hinder volunteering.
Third, domain-specific analyses showed that divorce increased men’s secular volunteer-
ing through the mechanism of decreasing attendance at religious services. This supports
Nesbit’s (2012) finding that divorce increases secular volunteering for men. We also found
that decreases in religious attendance were responsible for the increased volunteering of
men at secular organizations. These findings tend to support the stigmatization hypoth-
esis, namely, that declines in social contacts after divorce are more significant in voluntary
associations that have higher levels of sanctions against divorce. These findings suggest
that social norms play an important role in voluntary associations: “the more intolerant
the community is about divorce . . . the greater the chance of losing social contacts after
divorce” (Kalmijn and Uunk 2007:450).
Although religious attendance was found to mediate the relationship between divorce
and secular volunteering, measures of attendance at secular voluntary associations would
have enabled a direct examination of whether an increase in involvement in secular
voluntary association after divorce could contribute to increases in secular volunteering.
Because voluntary associations are vehicles for social integration for divorced men
(Gerstel 1988), participation in such organizations could help men restore social relation-
ships and facilitate their integration into a larger society (Kalmijn and Broese van
Groenou 2005). Future research would be well advised to examine whether increased
participation in secular voluntary groups is responsible for increases in secular volunteer-
ing among men.
Although we identified mediating roles of financial strain, religious attendance, and
formal group participation in the association between divorce and volunteering, it is not
possible to rule out the possibility of other causal mechanisms. We conducted supple-
mental analyses to explore three alternative mediators that are known to be correlated
with divorce and volunteering: depression, family income, and the number of children
under 18 years old in the household. First, it might seem plausible that increased depres-
sion could reduce volunteering after divorce because divorce is positively associated with
depression (Menaghan and Lieberman 1986), which in turn is negatively associated with
volunteering (Thoits and Hewitt 2001). However, no mediation effects were found for
depression. The effects of divorce on depression appear to be fully explained by decreases
in social integration, as Thoits and Hewitt found such evidence in data of the first two
waves of ACL (see Table 4, Panel B).
We found family income to mediate the relationship between divorce and volunteering.
In particular, family income measured at Time 3 mediated the negative effects of divorce
—whether between Times 1 and 2 (Mar1Div2Div3) or between Times 2 and 3
(Mar1Mar2Div3)—on volunteer hours (B = –.420, β = –.013 and B = –.698, β = –.030,
respectively) and range (B = –.126, β = –.015 and B = –.209, β = –.033, respectively) at
Time 4 among women. By contrast, women who remarried between Times 1 and 2 tended
to increase their volunteer hours (B = .344, β = .011) and range (B = .103, β = .012), in part
due to the increase in family income. This result suggests that family income as well as
financial strain mediates the association between divorce and volunteering. When finan-
cial strain was used as a primary mediator, as in Son and Wilson (2015), we found that the
effect of family income is not fully mediated by financial strain. We suspect that differ-
ences in the measurement of volunteering could have contributed to this discrepancy
because our results are based on the range of volunteering, while Son and Wilson used a
dichotomous measure for volunteering.
Next, we tested whether the number of children in the household mediated the
relationship between divorce and volunteering, as decreased numbers of children are
likely to reduce volunteering among men, in particular for noncustodial fathers. The
supplemental results provided some support in favor of mediation. That is, among
men, the transition to divorce at Time 3 reduced volunteer range at Time 4 (B = –.108,
β = –.011) because that transition decreased the number of children at Time 3
(B = –.841, β = –.144), which tended to increase the volunteering range at Time 4
(B = .129, β = .134). We found no significant mediation among women, perhaps
because they were more likely to have custody and thus experience little change in
the number of children. These findings confirm the well-established conclusion that
“volunteering is an instance of household production undertaken outside the home,” as
the presence of children in the household has positive effects on the supply of volunteer
labor (Brown and Zhang 2013:341). Besides formal group participation, number of
children in the household appears to function as a mediator in social integration
mechanism.
Finally, the methodological limitations of the present study must be noted. We utilized
four waves of ACL data, and as with any study using multiwave panel data, the sample
experienced attrition, from the original 3,617 subjects to 1,787 (representing 49.4% of the
original sample size). To maintain national representativeness, we used panel sampling
weights in all analyses. Readers should be aware, in addition, that the number of divorced
individuals in the sample was small. As with attrition, this issue was a data-related
constraint. In response, we call for future research to analyze panel data from larger
numbers of divorced individuals to replicate our findings.4
Despite these limitations, our study makes several contributions to our understanding
of the process by which divorce influences volunteering. First, unlike the previous two-
wave panel studies, our four-wave panel data allow us to establish causal ordering among
divorce, mediators, and volunteering. This study showed that increases in financial strain
and decreases in social integration are the most plausible mechanisms for the changes in
volunteering following divorce. Second, our findings demonstrate that these mechanisms
are gendered: economic hardship results in changes in volunteering for women, while
social isolation results in changes in volunteering for men. Last, we found evidence that
divorce increases secular volunteering among men due to declines in attendance at
religious services. Instead of quitting volunteer work, men appear to switch their domain
of volunteering from a religious to a secular one.
Notes
1. We conducted a t-test to compare those who left the sample before taking the Wave 4 survey
(n = 1,830) with those who remained and completed theWave 4 survey (n = 1,787). The analysis
indicated that dropouts were more likely to be Black, older, less educated, and of lower socio-
economic level as measured by family income (p < .01) (results available on request).
2. We included a dummy for those who remarried in order to control for the confounding
effects of change in marital status between Times 2 and 3. Because we focus on the effects of
divorce on volunteering, we did not have specific hypotheses about remarriage. But in
general, there may be little difference between those who were continuously married and
those who remarried, given that remarrying helps mitigate economic and social hardships
(Dewilde and Uunk 2008; Kalmijn and Broese van Groenou 2005).
3. Since the “other” category is not of the present study’s interest, we do not discuss the dummy
variable’s coefficients, while we report them in tables.
4. To explore the extent of these limitations, we conducted sensitivity analysis by estimating themodel
for the full sample (n = 3,617) without using panel sampling weight and a restricted sample of those
who completed all four surveys (n = 910) to see whether results varied across the different samples.
First, the use of the full sample slightly increased the number of (a) those who weremarried at Time
1 but divorced at Time 2 and remained divorced through Time 3, from 28 to 36, (b) those who were
married through Time 2 but divorced at Time 3, from 49 to 68, and (c) those who were married at
Time 1 and divorced at Time 2 but remarried at Time 3, from 18 to 25. The number of those in the
reference category, that is, those who married through Time 3 increased from 952 to 1,649. Since
they were estimated without using weights, the validity of results from this analysis is questionable,
but the results indicated support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 and no support for Hypotheses 3 and 4.
Specifically, women who were married at Times 1 and 2 but got divorced between Times 2 and 3
decreased volunteer hours and volunteering range in part due to an increase in financial strain
(Hypothesis 1), whereas their male counterparts were found to decrease volunteer hours as a
decrease in group involvement (Hypothesis 2). Second, results from analyzing the restricted data
(n = 910) remained the same as those from the present data (n = 1,787) in terms of hypotheses that
received empirical support. In sum, results of sensitive analysis were largely consistent with our
hypotheses (Complete results are available upon request).
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